Abstract: With a sample of 18,611 utility patents this paper studies the patent mix of 90 of the world's leading food and beverage multinationals (FBMs) from 1969±1994. It explores the statistical association within companies between patenting in food technology, in agriculture and in ten non-food technological fields. Food patenting is always positively associated with patenting in Biotech, Chemicals, Machinery and Other (e.g. textiles) technological fields, whatever the home country of the firm. The strongest associations arise between Food and Chemicals, and Food and Other technological fields. The multinational agrifood sector displays a common knowledge base across companies. Firms strategically combine such different types of technological capabilities in a variety of industrial situations, including sub-samples of both core-centred FBMs and unrelated FBMs, (i.e. companies diversifying into the chemicals/drugs or other industries). This suggests a strategic technological role for seemingly unrelated technological diversification, contrary to most received views.
Introduction
One of the most important firm-specific advantages that the multinational enterprise (MNE) takes to foreign markets is the possession of superior technology [1, 2] . The world's largest food and beverage multinationals (FBMs), which account for more than half of the world's patented innovations in food and tobacco [3, 4] and 40% of the market, are no exceptions. In host countries, their foreign affiliates are often the most important producers of technology [5] , a circumstance providing such companies with substantial competitive advantages over one-nation rivals.
Linked to their considerable unrelated diversification [7, 8] , giant FBMs could suffer, however, from a reduced technological focus. Besides innovating in food and agriculture, the world's largest FBMs also patent extensively in technological fields [9] seemingly unrelated to the food chain, such as Chemistry or Drugs [10, 11] . Their varied pattern of technological diversification could make them less coherent [12] and reduce potential synergies within companies across lines of business. FBMs encompass, it has been held, series of disconnected techniques, related only by demand-side considerations. Such techniques coexist within the FBM, the argument goes, chiefly because the company manufactures products embodying them (e.g. food, drugs, textiles), not because of an integration of different types of technological capabilities. However, researchers have seldom utilised empirical data to explore functional links among the different technological capacities of the FBM.
Here, we explore such associations. In doing so we study possible synergies among different technological capabilities in FBMs with diverse product orientation in order to have a better understanding of the knowledge base of the multinational agrifood sector.
A focus on the knowledge base of FBMs could help us to clarify controversial aspects of their industrial diversification and to assess their competitive advantages in terms of technology. To control the quality and characteristics of raw material supplies, the FBM often develops expertise in the agricultural and biotechnological technological fields [14, 15] . To exploit non-edible by-products, it could research in chemicals and other non-core technological fields. Moreover, the FBM could gaiǹ ownership' advantages by combining a variety of its technological capabilities [1] . It could develop combinative technological capabilities to create new innovation [16] , or use alternative techniques (e.g. biotech or chemical techniques) for solving processing problems [17] . Case studies show that one-nation F&B companies, instead, rather depend on suppliers, universities and other external sources for non-core technologies [18] . Thus, unlike FBMs, such companies could be less prone to combine different types of in-house technological capabilities, core or non-core, though comparisons are admittedly risky since, to our knowledge, there are no available statistical studies on such companies.
We will maintain that, beyond simple coexistence within the FBM laboratory, different brands of in-house knowledge could be functionally interlinked. We will also argue that the multinational agrifood sector displays a common knowledge base. To study the technological capabilities of the FBM we analyse 18,611 utility (technical) patents granted, from 1969±1994, to 90 companies taken from the world's 100 largest FBMs (the top group) in 11 different technical fields, both core and non-core.
To anticipate our results, patenting in Food and in some non-food technological fields associate recurrently whatever the home country of the FBM. The strongest associations are found between Food and Other, and Food and Chemicals. Both key pairs of own technologies strongly associate in a broad range of industrial situations, with the core-centred FBMs at one end and the unrelated FBMs at the other end of the spectrum. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 presents the theoretical and empirical background that informs our research, and our hypotheses. Section 4 displays our results and Section 5 the conclusions.
Theoretical background
To inform our research we draw on the literature on technological capabilities, internalisation theory and empirical studies about the technological activities of large F&B firms.
Technological capabilities are often a major element in determining a company's competitive advantages. However, both strategic management and international business scholars opine that developing such capabilities will not suffice: the company also needs to learn how to combine them and also orient them [16, 19] . The issue could pose problems in highly technologically diversified firms, as is often the case in large multinationals [20] .
As noted above, FBMs devote a large part of their efforts to innovation in non-food technical fields. In a sample of 106 large FBMs analysed from 1969±1994, we observed that non-food accounted, on average, for nearly 73% of the patents granted in the USA to such firms [11] , a very high share for non-core innovation. In chemical multinationals, for instance, non-chemical patents account for only 29% of the total [20] .
There are several reasons why FBMs innovate in non-food fields. It is evident that many of them are conglomerates, but such an explanation is only part of the answer. FBMs have reduced the share of their non-core businesses and at the same time increased the proportion of their non-core innovations as a percentage of their total number of patents [21] . On the other hand, Japanese FBMs, the group researching most in non-core technology, are the least product-diversified among top FBMs [8, 11] . This suggests that FBMs innovate in non-core technology for other purposes apart from unrelated diversification.
Based on previous studies, we will argue that FBMs could also innovate in non-core fields to develop knowledge useful in products and upstream industries. As will be seen below, their capabilities in non-core technology are often related to the food chain.
Among their motives for innovating in non-core technology could be that the FBM integrates the production of its inputs or equipment. As with other firms, it would internalise markets when it can produce intermediate goods cheaper [22] or, thanks to superior knowledge, better than suppliers [23] . During the 1990s, for instance, producing cheaper specialised ingredients than suppliers was a concern for many food firms owing to colluding practices in many of such markets. Connor [24] reports on more than 30 international or regional cartels [25] for food and feed ingredients, e.g. synthetic vitamins, nucleotides, lysine, etc., with average overcharges of 28% of the sales value. Firms also internalise markets when such markets do not work properly on an international scale [1] . Moreover, the FBM could internalise markets for ingredients and hence develop non-core technology because it fears the suppliers' competition in the market for foodstuffs. Processors of nutraceuticals, i.e. foodstuffs providing specific medical or health benefits [26] often depend on the technical capacity of suppliers [27] because the production of such products is highly intensive in Biotechnology, Chemicals or Drugs expertise [28] . They could also fear competition in this fast-growing, lucrative market since many such suppliers, especially pharmaceutical firms, have now their own nutraceutical departments [29] . By conducting its own research in Biotechnology, Chemicals or Drugs, the FBM could build barriers to entry, not only against other food firms but also against rivals coming from upstream industries. Some FBMs, however, might prefer to buy their equipment or inputs, as opposed to integrating their production.
Secondly, even those FBMs that prefer to purchase their equipment (inputs) could develop in-house knowledge on such items. Following the rationale in other multinationals [20] , even if the FBM does not manufacture`in-house' its equipment (inputs), it could need some expertise to customise them or to understand better their usages, so as to gain`dynamic capabilities' [19] . It could undertake research, we argue, through cooperation with suppliers. The empirical literature on the food company reports: * joint customisation of the equipment or inputs produced by suppliers [30, 31] * joint research of new, unforeseen usages for inputs produced by suppliers.
An example of the latter is Roquette-FreÁ res, a world leader in starch with around 600 different starch products, which cooperates closely with food industrialists to develop new applications for such ingredients [31] . Thus, when an FBM develops new in-house knowledge in non-core technology, we contend it could be attempting to improve its technical communication with suppliers [32] . In short, we consider that the FBM could internalise either markets for intermediate goods or markets for technical knowledge related to such goods. FBMs adopting the second strategy innovate in-house in fields related to such goods (as opposed to integrating them as in the former strategy). This motive could also explain why FBMs innovate in Biotechnology, Drugs, Chemicals, Instruments, etc.
Thirdly, the FBM could try to modify the characteristics of agricultural products or improve their quality [15, 33] , which could explain why the firm patents in agrochemicals, veterinarian drugs, biotechnology (e.g. seeds), etc. Fourthly, some FBMs produce, from agricultural raw materials, non-edible by-products such as starch, glue, size, etc. [31, 34] , which could explain why the firms innovate in Other technological fields (e.g. paper or textile innovations).
This brief review suggests that the R&D activities of the food multinational in non-core fields could be often strategically oriented (as opposed to demand-side oriented). It also shows that inventions in such fields are often related to the food chain and could eventually display synergies with innovation in Food or Agriculture.
In the light of the previous discussion we explore recurrent associations between patenting in Food and non-food technological fields at the company level. Next, we identify and explore the strongest of them in core-centred firms and diversified firms.
As product divisions could communicate insufficiently in large conglomerates, unrelated industrial diversification is often viewed as a symptom of the company's technological incoherence (for a survey of studies on industrial diversification, see [35] ). Some authors consider that even unrelated companies could, however, actually encompass a coordinated development of different brands of in-house technology (for critical visions of theories of diversification based on economies of scope and transaction-costs economics see [36] ).
Empirical evidence gathered in the multinational agrifood sector seems to confirm their opinion. Many FBMs have been reluctant to concentrate in core business over the last period [8] , in spite of the persistent advice of analysts [37] . One reason for reluctance could be, we suggest, that some unrelated FBMs perform well because they are technologically coherent. Observers have frequently claimed that the related firm performs better than the unrelated firm (conglomerate) but their point of view is not always confirmed by empirical studies. A statistical analysis of the world's 100 largest FBMs (the top group) from 1985±1996, for instance, shows that FBMs centred on core-products, i.e. agrifood, did not perform, as theorists would expect, much better than unrelated FBMs (after allowing for geographic diversification, lines of business, size of company and financial variables) [8] . Given such evidence in the food industry and in other sectors, some researchers maintain now that, beyond diversification into the same 2-digit industry, what really matters is common technological (and marketing) characteristics among lines of business [36] .
Hence, we will argue that unrelated diversification could hide actual coordination between core and non-core capabilities in FBMs. For this purpose, we research whether such brands of in-house capabilities associate in two different types of product-diversified firms: 3 The data
The companies
To study the top group, we select a sample of 90 FBMs from AGRODATA [38±40], a database that has gathered information on the world's 100 largest FBMs since the 1970s [41] . The reason for selecting them was that complete series were available for the 90 companies for 1969±1994. They are processors of dairy products, alcoholic drinks, etc.; some of them also produce agricultural products or diversify into non-food, including chemicals/drugs products and`other' products (like textiles). Our sample comprises 33 North-American FBMs that hold 62% of the total number of utility patents, 37 European (29%), 17 Japanese (9%) and 13 from other countries (0.1%).
Using patent data to measure technological capabilities
We measure technological capabilities [42] by counting the patents granted to the company in the USA. In spite of some drawbacks of this methodology [43, 44] , patent statistics provide a``unique long-term time series of inventive efforts on a worldwide basis'' [45, p.476] . Common objections to this method are less crucial here because we analyse only large global firms pertaining to the same industry, food and drinks; thus, our sample of companies is relatively homogeneous, which could imply similar patenting behaviour. Moreover, patents reflect, at the firm level, innovative activities and R&D expenditures [46, 47] . As in other international analyses of innovation [48, 49] , here we analyse foreign patenting in one particular country. We study patents granted to FBMs in the USA because patenting in such a country, as shown by the results of Soete [49] , probably reflects accurately the world's stock of technology.
The 18,611 utility patents granted, from 1969 to 1994, to the sample companies, have protected their intellectual property rights in a variety of technological fields. All the firms in our sample have patented at least one invention over the period. The patent data were collected by Science and Technology Policy Research (SPRU) at the University of Sussex (UK) [50] . Owing to limitations of the USPTO information, we could not distinguish between patents leading to product and process innovation (see [4] ). Also, we were unable to identify how many of the patents were implemented commercially.
Non-food innovation and the food chain
We analyse 11 technological fields in which our FBMs have been granted a patent [51] : Agriculture, Biotechnology, Chemistry, Drugs, Food, Instruments, Machinery, Other, Packaging, Refrigeration and Tobacco [52] . We consider as`non-food' (or non-core) the patenting in technological fields other than Food and Agriculture. Table 1 displays the characteristics of our sample of utility patents, showing that FBMs patent chiefly in the Food (nearly 5,000 patents over the period), Chemicals (4, 194) , Other (3,412) and Drugs (1,434) fields.
As stated, patenting in non-core technological fields could be related to the food chain and display synergies with patenting in Food or Agriculture.`Other' patents include, among others, innovations in electronics eventually destined to the food-processing plant [17, 53] . Innovation in Chemicals could consist of organic acids and other chemical products that food firms obtain from agricultural raw materials. To exploit new industrial usages of`traditional' organic substances, food companies deploy considerable R&D efforts.
Results and discussion

Patenting in Food and in non-core technology are correlated
For each firm, we correlate the patenting in Food with that in the ten other technological fields (Table 2 ) [54] in order to identify their recurrent association.
Whatever the home country, patenting in Food is always positively associated with patenting in Biotech, Chemistry, Machinery and Other fields. Correlation coefficients are positive and statistically significant over the whole multinational agrifood sector, and in three groups of FBMs (North American, European and Japanese), which shows our results are robust. The strength of the association between patenting in Food and in such technological fields varies from moderate (0.50< r ! 0.30) to strong (r ! 0.50). In all groups, linkages between Food and Chemistry and between Food and Other are the strongest. A strong association does not necessarily imply a cause-effect relationship between different types of technological output within the FBM, but rather that companies active in the Food technological field tend also to be innovative in the other four. It indicates, conversely, that even weak patentors of Food inventions produce a small complementary amount of patents in the related fields. That even low patentors of Food innovation patent small quantities of non-food inventions suggests that such firms try, for a variety of reasons, to keep up with new developments in food-related R&D though they do not necessarily manufacture equipment or inputs themselves.
Recurrent associations are noteworthy because FBMs from different origins show different characteristics in terms of size and product specialisation [7, 8] . The statistical results suggest that, within FBMs' laboratories, food and non-food innovation could be more integrated than often believed. Now, we examine three especially important linkages: Food and Chemicals, Food and Others, and Food and Drugs. In terms of the number of patents granted to our FBMs, these are, as noted, the three most important non-food patenting fields. As stated, the statistical associations between Food and Chemicals, and Food and Others, are the strongest. In our sample, 43 FBMs are core-centred firms, i.e. companies whose food sales account for 100% of their global sales (data on sales obtained from AGRODATA) [55] . Most of them innovate in Chemicals (58% of the sub-sample) and Other (84%), and more than one third in Drugs, though they do not manufacture chemicals, drugs or other non-food products. We do not claim that the core-FBM patenting activity in Chemicals, Drugs and Other is very intensive since the average number of patents they hold is small compared to those granted, over the studied period, to the average FBM ( Table 1 ). The core-centred FBM, from 1969 to 1994, averaged only 11 Chemical patents (' 23.2), one Drug patent (' 3.3) and 18.7 Other patents (' 33.6). However, even a modest level of innovative activity in such non-core fields could eventually suffice for the FBM to produce knowledge useful in upstream industries or in the manufacturing of by-products, which could be an advantage of the firm vs. food companies with no technical capabilities in such fields. Again, the level of patenting of the 43 FBMs in each of the three non-food technical fields is associated with company innovativeness in Food (Table 3 , columns 1±2). The reason why such FBMs innovate in Chemicals, Drugs and Other could not be their diversification into non-food business, since they are not product diversified, but rather some of the strategic reasons discussed above. Table 3 Bivariate non-parametric correlations of US patenting (1) These findings suggest that the multinational agrifood sector has a common knowledge base. Whatever the FBM's level of product-diversification, its capabilities in Chemicals, Drugs and Other always associate with its core technological capabilities. The findings also imply the FBM is able to coordinate its core and non-core capabilities when it diversifies into apparently disconnected businesses.
Conclusions
We have tested whether innovators in the Food technological field also tend to innovate in each of ten other non-food fields. Whatever the home country of the company, its in-house innovation in Food is always positively associated with its in-house innovation in Biotech, Chemistry, Machinery and Other fields. Such recurrent statistical associations across different types of companies suggest that FBMs produce intramural non-food technology for purposes other than diversifying into a portfolio of autonomous non-food businesses, as is often held. Within the FBM laboratory, the production of different types of knowledge is likely to be more interconnected than often believed.
Linkages between Food and Chemistry and between Food and Other capabilities are the strongest. The non-core fields where FBMs patent more inventions are Chemicals, Other and Drugs. We investigated further such relationships in core-centred FBMs, i.e. companies in which agrifood sales account for 100% of total sales. Most of them patent in Chemicals and, especially, in`Other'; one third of them, in the Drugs technical field. The patenting in Chemicals, Other and Drugs of the core-centred FBM is positively associated, sometimes intensely, with the level of its patenting in Food. These results confirm that FBMs could integrate in-house different types of technical capabilities for reasons other than demand-side considerations.
We also tested for possible associations between Food and Chemicals or Drugs capabilities when the food company diversifies into chemicals/drugs products. Far from being disconnected, such capabilities strongly interconnect within the company. Then, we investigated possible associations between Food and Other capabilities when the food company diversifies into`other' products (e.g. textiles). Again, the core and the non-core capabilities strongly associate. Unrelated industrial diversification could encompass, in the multinational agrifood sector, synergies between different brands of intramural technological expertise. Our study confirms the view that disconnected conglomerates (or, here, unrelated FBMs) could embrace technologically related businesses [36] . The reason why econometric analysis finds no great differences in performance between product-related and unrelated FBMs [8] could be the technological coherence of the latter.
In short, core-centred FBMs could innovate in non core-technologies for functional reasons (as opposed to demand reasons) while, at the other end of the spectrum, unrelated FBMs could actually coordinate their core and non-core technological capabilities to encourage technological synergies unsuspected at first sight. A reason for the emergence of synergies could be that the content of their inventions in non-core technology often relate to the food chain. A review of previous studies suggests that the FBM could patent in non-core technology for developing knowledge useful in new high-tech foods (e.g. nutraceuticals), by-products or upstream industries.
Our research is a first step towards the analysis of patenting in non-core technology as a potential competitive advantage of FBMs vs. other food firms. It is difficult to establish precisely whether both types of organisations display similar capabilities for there are no statistical studies, to our knowledge, on the patent mix of one-nation food firms. However, the comparison of our results with those of a study of knowledge relatedness for all types of food firms from six major OECD countries [59, 60] , suggests the presence of both similarities and differences between the two types of companies. The comparison should be viewed with caution because the Breschi et al. study refers to combinations of technologies coming from various sources, both internal and external to the firm, while ours focuses on in-house combinations. Even with such restriction in mind, it is interesting to observe that both the FBM and the average food firm combine Food technology with Biotechnology and, especially, Chemicals technology. By contrast, the FBM seems to combine Food technology with Drugs and Other fields of technology more often than the average firm. It could well be that the FBM is not only the most important single patentor in many geographic markets but also the one combining Food technology with more non-food techniques. 
